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Abstract. The concept of risk is essential to many problems 
in economics and business. Usually, risk is treated in the tra- 
ditional expected utility framework where it is defined only 
indirectly through the shape of the utility function. The pur- 
pose of utility functions, however, is to model preferences. 
In this paper, we review those approaches which directly 
model risk judgements. After a short review of naive risk 
measures used in earlier economic literature, we present re- 
cent theoretical and empirical developments. 
Zusammenfassung. Risiko ist ein Konzept, das bei der 
Behandlung vieler volks- oder betriebswirtschaftlicher Pro- 
bleme eine wesentliche Rolle spielt. 0blicherweise wird Ri- 
siko im Rahmen des traditionellen Erwartungsnutzenmodells 
behandelt, bei dem es nur indirekt fiber die Form der Nutzen- 
funktion erfagt wird. Der Zweck von Nutzenfunktionen 
besteht aber darin, Prfiferenzen zu modellieren. In diesem 
Aufsatz wird ein 0berblick fiber solche Ansfitze gegeben, 
die Risikowahrnehmungen direkt modellieren. Nach einer 
kurzen Darstellung naiver Risikomage, die aus der frfiheren 
6konomischen Literatur bekannt sind, werden neuere theo- 
retische und empirische Konzepte prfisentiert. 
Key words: Risk judgement, perceived risk, axiomatic mea- 
sures of risk 
Schliisselwiirter: Risikobeurteilung, wahrgenommenes Ri-
siko, axiomatische Risikomage 
1 Introduction 
The term risk obviously plays a pervasive role in much of the 
current writings on economic, political, social, and techno- 
logical issues. In all of these fields, risk is a kind of negative 
feature characterizing a decision alternative. Risk is meant 
to be a chance of injury or loss connected with a given ac- 
tion. However, risk is not an objective feature of a decision 
alternative. It is an inherently subjective construct because 
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what is considered a loss and what its significance and its 
chance of occurring is, is peculiar to the person concerned. 
In the economic as well as in the psychological litera- 
ture on decision making, there are various attempts to define 
or to characterize risk for purpose of  descriptive as well as 
of prescriptive theory. There is a growing interest in what 
constitutes the risk of an alternative and how to measure it. 
Thereby, the main emphasis lies on the risk itself of an al- 
ternative, independently of the problem of risk preference. 
Risk refers to the riskiness of an alternative. It is a mat- 
ter of perception or estimation. Risk preference refers to the 
preferability of an alternative under conditions of risk and 
is a matter of preferences. In such situations, risk is only 
one significant aspect of the available options. The deci- 
sion maker's preference for a certain action, generally, also 
depends on other positive or perhaps additional negative fea- 
tures. 
In this paper, we start from the assumption that there 
exists a meaningful risk ordering which can be obtained i- 
rectly by asking an individual to judge which of a given pair 
of comparable alternatives i riskier. The key concept will 
therefore be a binary relation ~, with A ~ B meaning that 
an alternative A is at least as risky as another alternative B. 
In general, this relation is assumed to be a weak order, i.e. 
strictly complete and transitive. Only in Sect. 11 complete- 
ness is resigned. Throughout the paper the relation A ~ B 
states that alternative A is riskier than alternative B while 
A ~ B means that A and B are equally risky. Thereby, 
and ~ denote the symmetric and the asymmetric parts of ~, 
respectively. The risk ordering - derived from judgements 
about perceived risk - need not be related to the individual's 
preference ordering in any simple way. 
According to the conception of standard measurement 
theory, we are looking for functions R which numerically 
represent the risk ordering ~, i.e. functions/~ with the prop- 
erty 
A ~ B ~ R(A) > R(B) .  (1) 
Every such function R will be called risk measurement func- 
tion or simply risk measure. Note that we take a subject's 
risk judgement as a primitive. As we are interested in mea- 
sures of perceived risk, we cannot and we should not give 
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an abstract definition of risk. It is peoples' perception which 
ultimately determines the definition of risk. 
There are three main reasons which necessitate a means 
for the direct comparison of alternatives as to their risk. 
First, the understanding of riskiness judgements might help 
to understand preference. Taking risk and value as primi- 
tives, one might explain preference by a risk-value model, 
i.e. by a function of these two components. Many theories 
in management and finance rely on such a separate con- 
sideration of risk and value. Possibly the best known ex- 
ample is modern portfolio selection theory as developed by 
Markowitz [48] and others. Within this context, the decision 
problem is viewed as choosing among possible risk-return 
combinations and formulated as either maximizing return for 
a given level of risk or minimizing risk for a given level of 
return. With such an approach, obviously, the decision will 
generally depend on the risk measure used. Second, there is 
growing empirical evidence that, under conditions of uncer- 
tainty, people base their decisions on qualitative aspects of 
choice alternatives uch as risk. For a study from the prac- 
tice of investment decision making see, e.g., Brachinger and 
Schubert [15]. Finally, judgements of perceived risk may be 
required as such, independent of the necessity of choice, e.g., 
for intervention before the decision stage in a public policy 
setting. People talk all the time about the riskiness of things 
like nuclear energy or how risky it might be not taking an 
afternoon ap. 
Despite the importance of risk, there is little consensus 
on its definition. In empirical studies, typically, two dimen- 
sions which appear to determine perceived risk have been 
identified: amount of potential oss and probability of oc- 
currence of loss. The risk of an alternative increases if the 
probability of loss increases or if the amount of potential 
loss increases. Unfortunately, up to now no agreement has 
been reached on the relative importance of the uncertainty 
of outcomes versus their undesirability for determining per- 
ceived risk. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that 
possible gains reduce the perceived risk of an alternative. 
But it is by no means clear how and to what extent risk 
perception depends on potential gains. Other empirical stud- 
ies have shown that risk is not simply equal to something 
like negative preference, it is an own important concept. 
E.U. Weber, Anderson and Birnbaum [67], e.g., suggest hat 
people, when judging the riskiness of an alternative, encode 
and combine probability and outcome information in quali- 
tatively different ways than when judging its attractiveness. 
Having accepted that risk is something different from 
risk preference, it would be interesting to know what the re- 
lation between risk and risk preference is. There are various 
theories of decision making under risk. Some of these theo- 
ries like risk-value models make explicit use of a risk mea- 
sure, others do not. Within the framework of the Expected 
Utility Model, e.g., a single alternative's risk is not quanti- 
fied, only an individual's general attitude towards risk is re- 
flected by the shape of his or her utility function and, given 
the utility function, quantified by the welt-known Arrow- 
Pratt measure. Nevertheless, we will neither eview the lit- 
erature on risk-value models nor discuss the relation of risk 
measures to utility based theories of decision making under 
risk. For an overview on risk-value models and their rela- 
tion to utility based theories of decision making under risk 
see Sarin and Weber [54]. We want to concentrate on one 
important component of risk-value models, the factor risk, 
independently of any risk preferences. The literature on risk 
and its measurement is relatively new, scattered in different 
fields and covering theoretical as well as empirical work. 
We also do not want to review the vast amount of liter- 
ature dealing with the psychology of risk judgements. See 
Slovic [58] and Bayerische Rtick [6] for an overview or 
Burgemeister and Weber [16] for an application. It is defi- 
nitely interesting to know that people in Hungary are more 
afraid of collecting and eating mushrooms than US-citizens 
and even more important how these judgements can be ex- 
plained. In our overview, we want to concentrate on how 
people evaluate the riskiness of lotteries, the fruit flies of 
modern economics. Risk measurement asit will be presented 
in our paper seeks to get behind specific contextual referents 
of risky alternatives to consider characteristics of risk that 
apply to many different situations. 
It is the objective of our paper, first, to review the more 
naive risk measures which have been used in the earlier eco- 
nomic literature and for which no strict theoretical founda- 
tions have been given. Then an overview is given on recently 
developed economic or psychological theories of perceived 
risk which rely on the axiomatic approach of modern mea- 
surement theory. (see also Brachinger [10], Weber [68], as 
well as E.U. Weber and Bottom [65]). In addition to a the- 
oretical discussion of risk measurement, we will review the 
empirical work investigating jugdements of perceived riski- 
ness. 
2 Naive risk measures 
In the economic, especially the finance literature, tradition- 
ally, the risk of an option has primarily been associated with 
the dispersion of the COlxesponding random variable. There- 
fore, not later than since Markowitz's [47, 48] and Tobin's 
[61] pioneering work on portfolio selection, it is common to 
measure the riskiness of an alternative by the variance c~  or 
the standard eviation cr of its outcomes. Let an alternative's 
future wealth be characterized by a random variable Y~ with 
distribution function F~ and probability density function re. 
Then, with the mathematical expectation 
+OO 
P 
:: E(~) :: / x dF~(x)~ (2) 
--oo 
these risk measures are defined by 
+OO 
O -2 :---- var(Y 0 1: / (x -- #)2d,F,2(x) (3) 
- -oo  
and 
+OO 
[ / (X -- [~)2dF~(x)]t/2. (4) O" 
o<3 
In addition, sometimes imilar naive risk measures are 
discussed (cf. Markowitz [48, pp. 286-297]). Within these 
are the expected absolute deviation around # 
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+O<3 
I x p (5) I dF~(x) 
- -0 r  
and the expected absolut deviation around 0 
+00 
. /  [ x l dF~(x). (6) 
- -OO 
Besides, it has been conventional wisdom in economics 
and other fields of research that risk is the chance of some- 
thing bad happening. In this vein, risk is associated with 
an outcome that is worse than some specific target outcome 
and its probability. Within the risk measures tailored to this 
notion of risk are the lower semivariance 
# 
f (x -- #)2dF~(x), (7) 
- -OO 
the expected value of loss 
0 
/ x dFz(x), (8) 
- -00  
and the probability of loss or probability of ruin 
P~(2 <_ r) = '~ dF~(x). (9) 
- -OO 
Thereby, r is a certain target level outcomes lower of which 
are a loss or disastrous to the decision maker. 
Stone [59, 60] has shown that all of these risk measures 
are special cases of one of two related three-parameter fami- 
lies of risk measures. The first three-parameter risk measure 
is defined as 
q(F~) 
:= / I x -  p(F~) l ~ dF,~(x) (k_>O), (10) Rs1 (Y:) 
where p(F~) denotes a reference level of wealth from which 
deviations are measured. The positive number k specifies a 
power to which deviations in wealth from the reference level 
are raised and thus k is a measure of the relative impact of 
large and small deviations. The parameter q(F~) is a range 
parameter that specifies what deviations are to be included in 
the risk measure. The second three-parameter risk measure 
is defined to be the k th root of RsI(Y~), i.e., 
q(F~) 
o 
:= [ / I x -p(F~) I ~ dF~(x)] j/k (k > 0). (11) Rs2(Y:) 
- -00  
Through appropriate choices of the parameters p(F.~), 
q(F~), and k it is easy to see that the above listed risk mea- 
sures are special cases of one of Stone's families. Equa- 
tion (10), e.g., gives the semivariance when k = 2 and 
p(F~:) = q(F~) = #. A further interesting special case of 
Stone's family (10) of risk measures is the generalized risk 
measure 
t 
P 
= / (t - x)~dF,:c(x) (c~ > 0), (12) RFI(~) 
proposed by Fishburn [28] where t is a fixed upper tar- 
get. This measure results from (10) if one chooses p(F.,e) = 
q(Fz) = t. The parameter c~ of Fishburn's risk measure RF1 
may as well as the parameter k in Stone's families be inter- 
preted as risk-parameter characterizing the decision-maker's 
risk attitude. Values a > 1 describe a kind of risk-sensitive, 
values a E (0, l) a kind of risk-insensitive behavior (see 
also Albrecht [1]). 
Other naive risk measures cattered in the literature are 
the Shannon entropy 
+00 
- / f~(x)ln(f~(x))dx (13) 
- -OO 
which is well-known from communication theory (cf. Ma- 
china and Rothschild [46, p. 203]), the interquartile range 
F~- 1(0.75) - F~ 1 (0.25), and the minimum outcome -x,~in 
of :~ (cf. Schneeweiss [55, p. 60]). For cases where values 
x < 0, i.e. losses are possible, the minimum outcome is 
usually called maximum loss (cf. Markowitz [48, p. 287]). 
3 Coombs' psychophysics of risk 
Among the first to approach the problem of risk itself, inde- 
pendently of the problem of risk preference, were Coombs 
and Huang [23]. They discuss two-outcome gambles of the 
form g = (Y, P, z), where two amounts y and z of money, 
y _> z, can be won with probability p and q = 1 -p ,  respec- 
tively. Let Y2p denote the space of all such two-outcome 
gambles with fixed winning probability p. Then, Coombs 
and Huang consider the transformed gambles 
a(g) := (y+a,p ,z -ap /q) ,  aEA (14) 
b(9) := (y+b,p,z+b),  bEB (15) 
and 
c(g) := (y,p, z) (c) , e E C, (16) 
where A, B are sets of real numbers and C is a set of natural 
numbers. (y,p, z) (~) designates that the gamble g is played 
c times independently. It is easy to show that the transfor- 
mation a(.) is expectation-preserving, and that a gamble's 
variance increases with a. Defining a gamble's g expected 
regret by (1 - p)(y - z), the amount a specifies the increase 
in expected regret caused by the transformation a(.). The 
transformation b(.) is variance-preserving, but increases a 
gamble's expectation by the amount b. Furthermore, multi- 
ple play leads to multiplying expectation correspondingly. 
Coombs and Huang show that any gamble g c f2p can be 
converted by the transformations a(-) and b(-) into any other 
gamble g' E Dp. Using the riskless gamble go = (0, p, 0) as 
origin, by means of the transformations a(-), b(.), and c(.) 
applied to go one gets a new risky gamble characterized by 
the triple (a, b, c). Thereby, a specifies gamble's (a + b, p, h -  
ap~q) expected regret, b gives this gamble's expectation, and 
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c states the number of independent repetitions of the gamble. 
Repetition multipies both expectation and expected regret. 
Coombs and Huang presume that the perceived risk of a 
gamble 9 E ~p characterized by (a, b, c) is completely de- 
termined by these variables. As measure of risk of a gamble 
g = (a, b, c) they propose the distributive model 
R(g) := [c~(a) +/3(b)]7(c), (17) 
where c~(-), /3(.), and 2/(-) denote real-valued functions. 
Heuristically c~, /3, and 2~ correspond to three psychophysi- 
cal functions for the subjective ffects on perceived risk of 
the corresponding transformations a(.), b(.), and c(.), respec- 
tively, on gambles. Empirical studies of Coombs and Huang 
[23, 24] showed that the function c~(.) may reasonably as- 
sumed to be strictly increasing, and/3(.) stricty decreasing. 
The function 2/(.) simultaneously intensifies the effect of ct(.) 
and/3(.). 
Coombs and Huang's measure of risk obviously is of low 
practical importance. It is tailored to a very special range of 
definition and Coombs and Huang do not say anything on 
how to specify the functions c~(.), /3(.), and 2/(.). However, 
Coombs and Huang were mainly interested in whether per- 
ceived risk has the structure of the simple distributive model 
and, if so, what might be said further about he functions in- 
volved. As an empirical result of their study it can be noted 
that the risk of a gamble g = (a, b, c) is perceived the higher 
the greater its variance and the lower the greater is its expec- 
tation. This follows from the above monotonicity properties. 
4 Pollatsek and Tversky's theory of risk 
Pollatsek and Tversky [52] were the first to investigate the 
perception of risk from the rigorous standpoint of measure- 
ment theory. Their theory is formulated in terms of a set 
S of real-valued random variables, interpreted as gambles 
with (arbitray numbers of) monetary outcomes. This set S 
is assumed to be closed with respect o the sum operation o
of random variables. The key concept of Pollatsek and Tver- 
sky's theory of risk is a binary relation on S denoted by 
which is assumed to be strictly complete and transitive. For 
~, ~ E S, :~ ~ ~ states that 35 is at least as risky as ~. 
Pollatsek and Tversky require their risk ordering 
to satisfy three different axioms, an independence axiom 
("Cancellation') and two more technical axioms ("Solvabil- 
ity" and "Archimedian"). In a first representation theorem, 
they show that, if these axioms hold, there exists a real- 
valued function, R, defined on S, such that for any :L Y C 5' 
~ ~9 ~=~ R(~) _> R(9). (18) 
This risk measure is additive in the sense that for all 2, 
9ES 
R(2 o ~)) : n(2) + R@), (19) 
and it is unique up to positive linear-homogeneous transfor- 
mations. Introducing three additional assumptions about the 
risk ordering, two transformation axioms and a continuity 
axiom, Pollatsek and Tversky succeed in proving that there 
exists a unique real number 0, 0 < 0 < 1, such that for any 
E S with expectation E(2) and variance var(Y~) its risk 
R(2) is given with 
R(2) = Ovar(Y:) - (1 - O)E(Yc) (20) 
(Pollatsek and Tversky [52, Theorem 2, pp. 546-547]). 
Thus, according to Pollatsek and Tversky's theory of 
risk, the risk ordering is generated by a linear combination 
of expectation and variance. The risk of any gamble with 
known expectation and variance can be readily computed, 
once a single parameter, 0 is determined. Its value specifies 
the relative contribution of the expectation and the variance 
to the riskiness of that lottery. This value can be easily calcu- 
lated from a single judgement of risk-equality between two 
different distributions. It should be noted that the risk mea- 
sure of Pollatsek and Tversky can take on negative values 
and that degenerate distributions, i.e., distributions where a 
single value is obtained with probability one, may well have 
non-zero risk. 
Subsequent empirical research as shown that the risk 
measure of Pollatsek and Tversky is not adequate. Coombs 
and Bowen [22] clearly have demonstrated that, despite the 
fact that perceived risk is indeed affected by both expecta- 
tion and variance of a gamble, they alone are insufficient to 
determine risk. They found, by using transformations that 
let expectation and variance unchanged, that subjects de- 
tect differences in risk between gambles that have the same 
mean and variance. Actually, risk varied systematically with 
the skewness of a gamble. See Sect. 10 for this and other 
stylized facts derived from a number of empirical studies. 
5 Luce's measures of risk 
Ensuing approaches to the problem of risk measurement, 
consistently, concentrated on the problem how certain trans- 
formations of choice alternatives affected people's percep- 
tions of their riskiness. These transformations included re- 
scaling, i.e., multiplying all outcomes by a positive con- 
stant, as well as translation, i.e., adding a (positive or nega- 
tive) amount o all outcomes (cf. Coombs and Bowen [22], 
Coombs and Huang [23, 24], and Coombs and Lehner [25]). 
Luce [41, 42] took up this approach by deriving risk mea- 
sures from functional equations characterizing the effect of 
rescaling on perceived risk. 
Luce [41] supresses the random variable notation and 
associates risk with densities. The set of all densities obvi- 
ously is closed with respect o rescaling. If f = f~ denotes 
the density function of a random variable ~ then for the 
density f~. of the transformed random variable c~Y~ holds 
f~(x )  = (1/a)f~(x/oO (21) 
where c~Y~ denotes the random variable gained from Y~ through 
rescaling by a scale factor c~ > O, i.e., through multiplying 
Y: by a positive real constant ~. 
Luce presumes that the risk R(fa~) of a density f~  is 
some function of the risk R(f~) of the density f~ and of ~. In 
his paper, he explores the two simplest possibilities, namely, 
that their effects are additive and that they are multiplicative. 
In a first assumption, Luce assumes that there is a strictly 
increasing function S with S(1) = 0 such that for all density 
functions f~ and all real c~ > 0 
t~(.f.~) = R(f~) + S(cx). (22) 
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In his second assumption concerning the structure of risk, 
Luce assumes that there is an increasing function S with 
S(1) = 1 such that for all density functions f~ and all real 
a>0 
R(f~) = S(a)R(f~). (23) 
A second class of assumptions concerns the nature of the 
aggregation of a density into a single number characterizing 
its risk. In a first assumption, Luce assumes that the density 
undergoes a pointwise transformation a d then is integrated. 
More specifically, he assumes that there is a non-negative 
function T, with T(0) = 0, such that for all density functions 
f 
+oo 
/ ,  
R(f) = / T(f(x))dx. (24) 
- -  C iX )  
In a second assumption, Luce supposes that there is some 
transformation of the random variable itself and R is the 
expectation of the resulting variable. More specifically, he 
assumes that there is a function T such that for all densities 
f 
+OG 
/ ,  
R(f) = / T(x)f(x)dz = E(T(Y:)). (25) 
Combining each structural assumption with each aggre- 
gational, Luce gets four different functional forms of risk 
measures. The parameters of these functional forms depend 
on the subject's risk perception and are to be determined 
such that they fit this perception best. Combining the first 
aggregation rule (24) with the additivity assumption (22) 
leads to 
+OO 
Rl(f) = -A / f(x)logf(x)dx +B, (26) 
- -  OC)  
with A > 0 and B > 0. Combining it with the multiplica- 
tivity assumption (23) leads to 
+OO 
R2(f) = A / f(x)l-~ (27) 
with A > 0 and 0 > 0. With both measures, Ra and/~2, the 
risk of a random variable Y~ is expressed by an integral of a 
certain non-linear transform of its density. The risk measure 
R1, obviously, is an affine transformation of the Shannon 
entropy (see Sect. 2). In both measures, no difference is made 
between potential losses and potential gains of :~. 
Combining the second aggregation rule (25) with the 
additivity assumption yields 
ac 0 
R3(f)=Bl f f(x)dx + B2 f f(z)dx 
0 - -oo  
+A E(log l Y~ I), (28) 
where B1, Be, and A are real numbers, A > 0. With this 
measure, the risk of a random variable :~ is quantified by a 
linear combination of the expectation of the log-transform of 
~, the probability of positive outcomes, and the probability 
of negative outcomes. 
Combining the second aggregation rule (25) with the 
multiplicativity assumption yields 
oc 0 
A1/'x~ A2 / Ix I 0 f(x)dx, (29) R4(f) = 
, J  , 2  
0 --o~ 
where 0 is a real number, 0 > 0, and 
1 
o 
= (0 + 1) / T(x)dx A1 (30) 
. J  
0 
and 
0 
A2 = (0 + 1) / T(x)dx. (31) 
, /  
--I 
With the measure R4, the risk of a random variable 2 is rep- 
resented by a linear combination of the conditional expecta- 
tion of positive outcomes and the conditional expectation of 
negative outcomes, where all outcomes are raised to some 
power 0. An important feature of the risk measures R3 and 
R4 is that gains and losses are treated separately and in a dif- 
ferent manner. In the measure R4, the "chance component" 
of :~, i.e. the possible gains, and its pure "risk component", 
i.e. the possible losses, combine clear-cut additively. 
Luce leaves the question of the reasonableness of these 
forms to empirical investigation. Nevertheless, he remarks 
that many psychologists believe that the risk of a gamble 
that is repeated n times is less than n times the risk of the 
gamble played once. This is known to hold only for the 
risk measure R3 and fails for the others. However, the risk 
measure R3 suffers, as well as the risk measure R4, from 
another drawback. It increases with a for positive uniformly 
distributed random variables with constant range b - a, For 
some people, this property is highly counter-intuitive. In fact, 
there is empirical evidence that risk decreases if a positive 
constant is added to all outcomes of a gamble (see Sect. 10). 
There are two fundamental problems with Luce's struc- 
tural and aggregational ssumptions. A first problem con- 
cerns the additivity assumption (22). This assumption obvi- 
ously implies that a gamble having zero risk is transformed 
by any change of scale into one with non-zero risk. Rescal- 
ing by any positive factor c~ < 1 leads to negative risk, 
whereas risk is increased by rescaling with any c~ > 1. This 
argument favours the multiplicativity assumption (23) and 
thus the risk measures R2 and R4. 
A second fundamental problem concerns the first aggre- 
gation rule (24). This aggregation rule leads to risk measures 
which are translation i variant or location free. Thereby, a 
risk measure R is called translation i variant or location free 
if and only if 
R(f~+z) = R(f~) (32) 
where f~+z denotes the density of the transformed random 
variable ~ +/3 gained from :~ through translation by/3, i.e., 
by adding a real constant/3. Translation invariance of risk 
measures of type (24) is immediately shown by 
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f f 
= /T( f~(x))dx = R(f~). (33) 
Translation invariance of risk measures of type (24) im- 
plies that the risk measures R~ and R2, for any shift family 
of distributions, depend only on the range and are indepen- 
dent of the location of a random variable. It follows, e.g., 
that gambles with a uniform distribution of the same range 
b - a are, in the sense of ~1 and R~, equally risky irrespec- 
tively of their location. Again, this property can be regarded 
as highly counter-intuitive. In fact, it can be deduced from 
the empirical evidence mentioned above that risk depends 
on the location of a gamble (see Sect. 10). 
It should be noted that also most of the naive risk mea- 
sures reviewed in Sect. 2 are translation invariant. This holds 
in particular for the most important risk measures used in fi- 
nance, namely variance (3), standard eviation (4), and lower 
semivariance (7). Risk of a random variable is measured in- 
dependent of its location. In contrast o this, Coombs' dis- 
tributive risk model (17) as well as Pollatsek and Tversky's 
risk measure (20), are not location free. Both risk measures 
decrease if a positive constant is added to all outcomes of 
a gamble. For a short discussion of the issue of translation 
invariance of risk measures, again, see Sect. 10. 
E.U. Weber [62, 63] investigated Luce's four assump- 
tions (22) through (25) and the properties of the risk mea- 
sures implied. Empirical evidence against ranslation invari- 
ance of perceived risk (see E.U. Weber [62]), first, led her 
to reject assumption (24) and therefore the risk measures 
(26) and (27). Then she pointed out (see E.U. Weber [63]) 
that the risk measure (28) can be ruled out because of its 
unreasonable behavior in the neighborhood of zero. Obvi- 
ously, this measure approaches negative infinity if, e.g., any 
positive gamble with uniform distribution is rescaled by a 
factor c~ > 0 converging to zero. 
Revising and extending Luce's model (29), Luce and 
E.U. Weber [44] presented a new axiomaticly based risk 
model, called conjoint expected risk (CER). Like Pollatsek 
and Tversky [52], Luce and E.U. Weber start from an arbi- 
trary set ~r of real-valued random variables, interpreted as 
gambles with (arbitray numbers of) monetary outcomes, and 
assume that the decision maker involved has a binary risk 
ordering, ~, on 5K~. Then the CER model is derived from a 
certain system of axioms or assumptions on ~. 
First, two axioms are presented which are purely tech- 
nical and could be omitted if the authors assumed that the 
domain of the risk measure consists of all possible random 
variables. Another axiom simply postulates that the risk mea- 
sure is well behaved near 0. A further axiom requires that 
the risk ordering fulfills certain assumptions implying the 
expectation principle, i.e., transitivity, continuity, and inde- 
pendence, well known from expected utility literature. These 
four axioms do not offer any special insight into what is spe- 
cial about the CER measure. It is a final fifth axiom which 
shapes the risk ordering. 
This axiom consists of four requirements on ~. Let Yc and 
be two random variables in ,~: which, both, can take on 
only positive outcomes or, both, can take on only negative 
outcomes and let a, b, b ~, and b" be positive real numbers. 
Then, the first requirement of this axiom is the independence 
condition 
: cLz )  ~ aYeS@,  (34) 
and 
aye L bye ~ a~? L @'  (35) 
Condition (34) states that a change in scale does not change 
the risk ordering between random variables which, both, can 
take on only positive outcomes or, both, can take on only 
negative outcomes. The second part (35) of the independence 
condition says that if, for any random variable which can 
take on only positive or only negative values, one scale is 
perceived as at least as risky than onother scale, then the 
same ordering holds for any other random variable which can 
take on only positive or only negative values, respectively. 
The second condition states that the ordering induced 
by independence on the positive reals R + is the ordinary 
ordering _>, i.e. 
aye ~ bye e==~ a >_ b. (36) 
Assuming independence, this condition says that the riski- 
ness of gambles which can take on only positive or only neg- 
ative outcomes is an increasing function of the scale value. 
Thus, e.g., the gamble ye -- ($15, .5;$1) is perceived to be 
less risky than the gamble 42 = ($60, .5; $4). 
As a third requirement a condition of restricted solv- 
ability is introduced which states that for any two random 
variables .~ and ~) which, both, can take on only positive val- 
ues or, both, can take on only negative values there exists a 
positive real number b such that 
b '$~aye~b"~ ~ @~aye.  (37) 
This solvability condition says that perceived risk is a con- 
tinuous function of scale changes. Note, that this solvability 
condition is different but related to the standard continuity 
assumption which is part of the axioms which imply the 
expectation principle. 
As the fourth requirement of this axiom an Archimedean 
condition is introduced which states that for any two random 
variables ye and ~ which, both, can take on only positive 
outcomes or, both, can take on only negative outcomes there 
exists a positive real number a such that 
Y: ~- 9 ~ a9 L y:' (38) 
This condition says that given two gambles 2 and ~9 where 2 
is riskier than ~, then, by means of a sufficiently large scale 
transformation, ~ can be transformed into a gamble that is 
at least as risky as ye. 
Based on these axioms on the risk ordering ~, Luce and 
E.U. Weber [44] prove that ~ can numerically be represented 
through the CER-model RcER(Yc) which, for any (discrete 
or continuous) random variable ye C ,~,  is given by 
RCER(Ye) = BI dF~(x) + B2 dEc(x) 
OO 
+B3 dF~(x) + A1 Ix 
OO 
jo +A2 x~ (39) 
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where Bi, Ai, and 0i are scaling constants, Oi > 0, and Fe. 
denotes the distribution function corresponding to :L 
As a result, according to the CER-model, perceived risk 
of a "gamble" :? can be quantified by a linear combination 
of the probability of negative outcomes, the probability of 
positive outcomes, and the probability of the zero outcome 
as well as the conditional expectation of negative outcomes 
raised to some power 0~ and the conditional expectation of 
positive outcomes raised to some power 02. As Luce's mea- 
sure R4, the measure RCER evaluates gains differently from 
losses and the "chance component" of a "gamble" and its 
pure "risk component" combine additively. But, contrary to 
R4, the probabilities to win, to lose and to break even are 
additionally part of this risk measure. For gambles with only 
positive or only negative outcomes the CER-model is equiv- 
alent to R4. Therefore, it suffers from the same behavioral 
problems as pointed out above for R4. The high number of 
scaling constants poses an additional challenge for a reliable 
assessment of the risk measure RCER. 
It should be noted that, in general, the scaling constants 
Ai and Bi of the CER-model (39) can take on negative or 
positive values, depending on the decision maker's risk or- 
dering. For a particular individual, these scaling constants 
can be easily estimated from a sample of observed judge- 
ments of perceived risk. Based on their perceived risk judge- 
ments, E.U. Weber [64] estimated the parameters of the 
CER-model for several individuals. For all of these individ- 
uals she found A1 and B1 to be positive as well as A2 and 
B2 to be negative. In such cases, the probability of positive 
outcomes of a gamble as well as their conditional expecta- 
tion reduce the gamble's perceived risk and the risk measure 
(39) can take on negative values when the positive outcome 
contributions outweigh the negative outcome contributions. 
It is interesting to think about the system of axioms on 
which the CER-model is founded. All axioms make intutive 
sense, and, in addition, do not appear to be so strong. Nev- 
ertheless, these axioms imply a pretty restrictive set of risk 
measures, quite different from what we will come to know 
in the next sections. 
6 Sarin's measures of risk 
The purpose of Satin's paper [53] is to extend Luce's risk 
measures to obtain risk measures that are empirically more 
reasonable. Therefore, Sarin starts from the overwhelming 
empirical observation that the risk of a gamble appears to 
decrease when all possible outcomes are improved by a con- 
stant, i.e., when a positive constant is added to all outcomes 
of a gamble. 
Sarin's first assumption concerns the risk of the density 
f~+~ belonging to the transformed random variable ~ +/3. He 
assumes that R(f~+~) is a multiplicative function of R(f~) 
and/3. More specifically, it is assumed that there is a strictly 
monotonic function 5: with 5:(0) = 1 such that for all density 
functions f~ and all real/3 > 0 
R(f,~+~) =5:(/3)R(f~). (40) 
Thereby, without being explicitly stated, it is assumed that 
R(fs:+~) decreases as/3 increases. For non-negative risk mea- 
sures this implies that 5:(.) is strictly decreasing. 
As indicated in the last section, Luce's first aggregational 
assumption (24) implies risk measures which are translation 
invariant. Holding such risk measures to be empirically not 
reasonable, Satin therefore, in his second assumption, re- 
quires that the expectation principle (25) be used to aggre- 
gate densities into single numbers. 
From these two assumptions Satin derives the risk mea- 
sure 
+OO 
R(f) = / KeCXf(x)dx = KE(e~ (41) 
- -oo  
with real constants K > 0, c < 0, or K < 0, c > 0. 
Through this measure, risk of a random variable Yc, essen- 
tially, is represented by the expectation of its exponential 
transform. 
As, for example, implicitly stated in Luce's assumption 
(24), it seems sensible to assume risk measures to be non- 
negative. This implies for Sarin's risk measure c < 0 and 
K > 0. Evidently, this risk measure gives higher weight 
to a gamble's potential osses than to its potential gains. 
Because of assumption (40), Satin's risk measure does not 
suffer the last critizism of Luce's risk measures, it is not 
location free and, in particular, decreases under translations 
with increasing/3. Furthermore, it can be easily shown that 
it increases with the scale factor c~ under rescaling. 
Weber [68[, contrary to Sarin advocating translation in- 
variance of risk judgements, presents an extension of Sarin's 
risk measure (41). To make this measure location free he 
suggests, first, to "normalize" gambles by substracting their 
respective xpected values, i.e., to transform all random vari- 
ables ~ to the "normalized" variables 
~' = ~' - E(~). (42) 
The "normalized" random variables all have zero mean and 
reflect the risk of the original distributions with reference to 
their expectation. Thereby, the expectation serves as a tar- 
get outcome such that every outcome whose value is smaller 
than the expectation is viewed as undesirable or risky, while 
outcomes with values as large as the expectation are desir- 
able or nonrisky. 
Weber's location free variant of Sarin's risk measure (41) 
is then given with 
+oo 
R'(f) = I KeC(~-e('+))f(x)dx = KE(eC~')' (43) 
oo  
with real constants K > 0, c < 0 . Through this measure, 
risk of a random variable Yc, essentially, is represented by the 
expectation of the exponential transform of its normalized 
version Y~'. Weber points out that for normally distributed 
random variables the measure (43) and the variance (3) yield 
the same risk ordering of lotteries. In Sect. 9 will be shown 
that (43) can also be derived using a quite different way of 
arguing. 
Sarin's risk measure (41) as well as Luce's risk mea- 
sures R3 and R4 use the expectation principle for aggregat- 
ing densities into single numbers. This principle implies that 
resulting risk measures are linear in probabilities. I e., if, for 
0 < 0 < 1, the gamble with 0 chance of obtaining density 
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f and (1 - 0) chance of obtaining density fo is denoted by 
Of + (1 - O)fo, we have 
R(Of + (1 - O)fo) = OR(f) + (1 - O)R(fo). (44) 
Thus, if f and 9 are judged to be equally risky, then all the 
gambles Of + (1 -O) fo  and 09 + (1 -O) fo  will also be judged 
equally risky. In other words, if the expectation principle is 
used for aggregating densities into risk numbers, then, for 
any given distribution fo, the risk function is, between fo 
and any other distribution f,  independent of f as long as f 
belongs to a set of distributions with some given risk level. 
It is well-known that linearity in probabilities is a pretty 
strong requirement when preferences are modelled. In deci- 
sion theory under risk quite a number of new theories has 
been developed to overcome this strong requirement implied 
by the expectation principle (for an overview see Weber and 
Camerer [69]). In the spirit of the generalization of expected 
utility theory by Machina [45], Sarin generalizes Luce's ex- 
pectation assumption (25) to 
J J 1 R(f) = r(x)f(x)dx + S(I x I)f(x)dx] 2. (45) 
- -00  - -  00  
Thereby, T(.) is a real function and S(.) is that strictly mono- 
tonic function the existence of which is postulated in Luce's 
assumptions (22) and (23), as well as in Sarin's assumption 
(40). In this generalized expectation form of a risk measure 
the "local" risk function depends on the gamble. As a con- 
sequence, even if two densities f and g are equally risky, 
Of + (1 - O)fo and 09 + (1 - O)fo may not have equal risk. 
Sarin points out that the generalized expectation assump- 
tion (45) can, just as Luce's expectation assumption, be com- 
bined with different structural assumptions to derive alterna- 
tive measures of risk. Combining the generalized expectation 
assumption, in turn, with Luce's structural assumptions Sarin 
gets two new families of risk measures. Combining it with 
the additivity assumption (22) he obtains the risk measure 
oo 0 
R(f) : Bl f f(cc)dx + B2 f f(z)dz 
0 - -ac  
+AE(Iog l x I ) -  ~AZvar(l~ x I) (46) 
with some constants BI, B2, and A > 0. Combining it with 
the multiplicativity assumption (23) he receives the risk mea- 
sure 
oo 0 
R(f) = Be /x~ B2 / IX I ~ f(x)dx 
~2 
0 - -00  
~var( I x I~ (47) 
It should be noted that in the generalized risk measures 
(46) and (47) of Sarin as well as already in Luce's risk 
measures (28) and (29) potential gains and potential osses 
are treated separately. This seems to be in accordance to 
observed ifferential preference attitudes towards gains and 
losses. Sarin stresses the fact that empirical data will be 
needed to test the validity of the generalized expectation 
principle and the corresponding generalized risk measures. 
7 Fishburn's measures of pure risk 
Various empirical studies have demonstrated that prefer- 
ence attitudes towards gambles exhibit striking differences 
in the loss and the gain regions (cf. Fishburn and Kochen- 
berger [31], Hershey et al. [33], Kahneman and Tversky 
[35], Laughhunn et al. [40], Payne et al. [50, 51]). Although 
the association of preferences between probability distribu- 
tions with the distributions' risks is far from being clear, 
it seems reasonable to assume that these differences also 
play an important role in risk assessments. Furthermore, ex- 
periments with monetary gambles have convincingly shown 
the salience of loss probability and loss amount on perceived 
risk (cf. Aschenbrenner [5], Coombs and Lehner [25], Payne 
[49], Slovic [57]). Based on these observations, Fishburn, in 
his Foundations of Risk Measurement [29, 30], developed 
theories of risk in which gains and losses are treated sepa- 
rately. In the first part of his study, Fishburn focusses on risk 
as probable loss, i.e. on what is usually called pure risk. In 
the second part, measures of risk are proposed that include 
effects of gains on perceived risk. 
In the first part of his study, Fishburn is guided by the 
conventional wisdom that risk is a chance of something bad 
happening, that risk arises from the possibility of undesired 
outcomes. As Pollatsek and Tversky, Fishburn's theory of 
risk is based on a binary risk relation ~, "is at least as risky 
as", defined on a set of probability distributions of some 
outcome values. From the standpoint of measurement theory, 
this relation is to be represented by a numerical risk measure. 
Similar to the way Pollatsek and Tversky derive their risk 
measure, Fishburn's measures are a direct consequence of 
the axioms the risk relation is fulfilling. 
In the spirit of most of the classical risk measures used 
in finance and of Luce's assumption 24, Fishburn implicitly 
adopts the position that risk judgements are location free. 
Therefore he presumes that some target outcome can be iden- 
tified so that every outcome whose value is smaller than the 
value of the target is viewed as undesirable or risky, while 
outcomes with values as large as the target's are desirable 
or nonrisky. Without loss of generality, for convenience, the 
value of this target outcome is set at zero. Fishburn regards 
a distribution as having zero risk if and only if it has no 
chance of delivering a outcome below zero. 
More specifically, Fishburn starts from the assumption 
that all possible outcomes are ordered by preference and 
represented numerically so that one outcome is preferred to 
another if and only if the former has a larger value. Let X 
denote the (non-empty) set of all possible outcome values. 
Non-zero outcome values are partitioned into undesirable 
and desirable subsets as X -  := {x E X ] x < 0} and 
X + := {x C X ] x > 0}. The outcomes in X -  (X -  ~ 0 
by assumption) are referred to as losses, and the outcomes 
in X § as gains. 
Probability distributions of X are defined on the (7- 
algebra of subsets of X generated by all singletons and 
"intervals" of outcomes. With regard to its pure risk ev- 
ery probability distribution of X is characterized by the pair 
(a,p), where the parameter a, 0 _< a _< 1, gives the loss 
probability of that distribution and p is its conditional dis- 
tribution, given a loss. The pair (a, p) is to be interpreted as 
a two-dimensional measure that yields the probability of a 
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subset Y of X -  as ap(Y). Then, the binary risk relation 
is applied to the set 
A := [0, 1] x P := {(a,p) I 0 < a < 1,p E P -} ,  (48) 
where P -  is the set of all probability measures p with 
p(X-)  = 1. By identifying every outcome value x 9 X -  
with (1,p) where p({x}) = 1, this set contains all determin- 
istic losses. 
The risk relation ~- defined on A is assumed to be a 
weak order, i.e. strictly complete and transitive. Then, for 
a first basic representation theorem, Fishburn uses four ax- 
ioms. Among these a continuity axiom and an axiom that 
states that for every measure in P - ,  some deterministic toss 
is at least as risky as the measure. Another axiom states that 
risk increases as the loss probability increases for fixed p, 
another one that worse outcomes entail greater isks. The 
latter axioms seem reasonable in view of the common per- 
ception that risk increases as bad outcomes become more 
probable, and as probable bad outcomes get worse. In his 
first basic representation theorem, Fishburn shows that there 
is a non-negative r al-valued function p on A with 
(a, p) ~ (a',  p') r p(a, p) > p(a', p') (49) 
which has p(a,p) = 0 if and only if a = 0, and is continuous 
and increasing in a. 
Three additional axioms yield what Fishburn calls a-p- 
separability, namely the existence of real-valued functions 
Pl on [0,1] and P2 on P -  such that 
p(a,p) = p l (a ) '  P2(P) (50) 
Thereby, the function Pl is continuous and increasing in a 
with p~(0) = 0, and the functional P2 is, restricted to one- 
point-distributions Px over X - ,  increasing as x decreases. 
Certain combinations of additional axioms, then, yield 
special forms of risk measures of the multiplicative separable 
type (50). Fishburn axiomizes risk measures of type 
p(a,p) = p l (a )  { pz(x)dp(x), (51) 
x 
p(a,p) = a { p2(x)dp(x), (52) 
x-  
and 
p(a,p) = pl(a) f Ix I ~ dp(x), (53) 
x-  
where 0 is a real parameter, 0 > 0. With all of these types 
of risk measueres, each outcome x is identified with the 
one-point measure Px and integration is Lebesque-Stieltjes- 
integration. 
In a further theorem, Fishburn gives conditions for the 
representation of ~ by a risk measure of the expectation 
type 
p(a,p) = /" p(a, x)dp(x). (54) 
x 
This corresponds to the expectation principle (25) used by 
Luce and Satin as aggregational ssumption. 
These families of risk measures contain some of the 
naive risk measures listed in Sect. 2 as special cases. In the 
family (53) of risk measures, the choice Pl (a) = a together 
with 0 = 1 yields the expected value of loss (8) of a ran- 
dom variable; the choice pl(a) = a together with 0 = 2 
leads to the lower semivariance (7) of a mean-centered ran- 
dom variable. Furthermore, the family (53) of risk measures 
with pl(a) = a is contained in Stone's family (10), if one 
chooses there p(F) = q(F) = 0. The risk measures (52) and 
(53) obviously are special cases of the more general familiy 
(51). With the choice pl(a) -- a, the family (51) yields (52), 
with the choice pZ(x) =1 X I 0 it yields (53). With the choice 
pa(a) =-- a, the family (53) leads to the risk measures (12) 
which Fishburn considered in his earlier paper [28]. 
8 Fishburn's measures of speculative risk 
In the second part of his Foundations of Risk Measurement 
[29], Fishburn considers measures of risk that explicitly in- 
clude effects of gains on perceived risk. He adopts the po- 
sition that increased gains reduce the risk of fixed probable 
losses without completely negating this risk. Thus he fo- 
cusses on what is usually called speculative risk. Speculative 
risk measures, generally, are to incorporate the consensus 
that risk increases as loss probability or amount increases, 
and that greater gains as well as greater gain probabilities 
reduce perceived risk. As Fishburn's theory of pure risk, his 
theory of speculative risk is based on a binary risk relation 
~, "is at least as risky as", defined on a set of probability 
distributions of some outcome values. Again, this relation is 
to be represented by a numerical risk measure. 
As in his first study, Fishburn starts from a non-empty 
set X of numerical outcome values that includes a non- 
risky target outcome. Without loss of generality, the value 
of that target outcome is set at zero. As above, the set of all 
non-zero outcomes is partitioned into an undesirable subset 
X of losses and a desirable subset X + of gains, each of 
which is assumed non-empty. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that outcome preference increases in x. 
Again, probability distributions of X are defined on the 
a-algebra of subsets of X generated by all singletons and 
"intervals" of outcomes. With regard to its speculative risk 
every probability distribution of X is characterized by the 
quadrupel (a, p;/3, q), where, as above, the parameter a, 0 _< 
a _< 1, gives the loss probability of that distribution and p 
is its conditional distribution, given a loss. The parameter 
/3, 0 _</3 _< 1, gives the gain probability of that distribution 
and q is its conditional distribution, given a gain. Hence, 
the probability for the target-outcome {0} equals 1 - a - 
p. The quadrupel (a,p;/3,q) is to be interpreted as a four- 
dimensional measure that yields the probability for a subset 
Y of X -  as ap(Y), and the probability for a subset Z of 
X + as/3q(Z). 
Then, the risk relation is applied to the set 
B = {(a,p;/3, q)]a,/3 > O,a+/3 < 1, 
p E P - ,q  9 P+}, (55) 
where P -  is defined as above, and P+ is the set of all 
probability measures q with q(X +) = 1. By identifying every 
outcome value x 9 X -  with (1,p) where p({x}) = 1 and 
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every outcome value x E X + with (1, q) where q({z}) = 1, 
this set contains all deterministic losses and gains. 
Also in this generalized case, the risk relation ~ defined 
on B is assumed to be a weak order. Then, Fishburn presents 
sufficient conditions for a basic representation of ~ by a 
non-negative r al-valued function R on B that has 
R(c~,p;3, q) = 0 ~ c~ = 0 (56) 
and satisfies, for all (c~,p;/3, q), (7, r; 6, s) E B 
(c~,p;3, q)~( ' , / , r ;6, .s)  .: ;. 
R (c~,p;3, q) > R(7, r;6, s). (57) 
It should be noted that, according to condition (56), there 
is no risk if and only if there is no chance of getting an unde- 
sirable outcome. Therefore, this condition rules out measures 
of risk that are additively separable in gains and losses in 
the sense of 
R(O~, p; 3 ,  q) = R1 (OZ, p)  -t- R2(3 ,  q) ,  (58) 
with a gain part R2 and a loss part RI. 
Condition (56) has two interesting empirical implica- 
tions. According to that condition, every sure loss (o~ = 1) 
has non-zero risk and is therefore regarded as risky. In addi- 
tion, every 50 - 50 gamble of receiving the target outcome 
or some amount above the target outcome (ct = 0) has zero 
risk and is therefore regarded as riskless. Both properties are 
highly controversial, as can be verified in any class-room ex- 
periment. 
For a first representation theorem, Fishburn uses five ax- 
ioms. Among these are a continuity condition for loss and 
gain probabilities and an axiom which asserts ome suitably 
bad outcome which is at least as risky as a given p E P - .  
The third axiom states the commitment to no risk when there 
is no chance of loss. The first two axioms assert monotonic- 
ity for gain and loss probabilities and for gains and losses, 
respectively. These axioms are in accordance with the con- 
ventional notion of speculative risk. In his representation 
theorem, Fishburn shows that there is a non-negative real- 
valued function R on B satisfying conditions (56) and (57) 
that is continuous and increasing in loss probability as well 
as continuous and decreasing in gain probability when the 
loss probability is positive. 
In Fishburn's tudy a series of further axioms is formu- 
lated. Certain groups of axioms assure special types of risk 
measures. According to commitment (56), only such repre- 
sentations are considered which are multiplicatively separa- 
ble in a risk-part quantifying an option's pure risk and a 
chance-part expressing an option's potential gain. In his ap- 
proach, Fishburn essentially follows conventional conjoint 
measurement (cf. Krantz, Suppes, Luce, and Tversky [39]). 
The axiomatized types of risk measures include 
R(c~, p; 3, q) = p(c~, p)T(3, q), (59) 
/ / _R(c~,p;3, q) = [ p(c~, x)dp(x)][ 7-(3, y)dq(y)], (60) 
X-  X + 
R(ct,p; 3, q) = [Pl(O~) / p2(x)dp(x)] 
X-  
• [ 1 - ~-1 (/3) / ~-2(y)dq(y)]. (61 ) 
X + 
These types of risk measures get more and more special- 
ized. The family (59) has the basic multiplicatively separable 
form. The second is a specialization using the expectation 
principle for the risk-part as well as for the chance-part. 
The third family (61) goes a step further by separating out 
the effects of loss and gain probabilities. Assuming that the 
indifference relation ~ implied by the risk relation ~ is pre- 
served under uniform rescaling of outcomes in his pure risk 
setting Fishburn, finally, arrives at the risk measure 
R(c~,p;3, q) = [pl(c~) f ]x  10 dp(x) 
X-  
T1(3) / Tz(y)dq(y)]. (62) x [1 
X + 
The central idea of all these families of speculative risk mea- 
sures is that gains reduce risk in a proportional way that is 
independent of the particular (a, p) involved, unless c~ = 0, 
in which case there is no risk to be reduced (cf. Fishburn 
[29, p. 228]). 
The risk measure (62) is the most specific risk mea- 
sure axiomatized by Fishburn. For deducing this measure he 
refers to no less than 19 axioms. Fishburn [29, p. 242] him- 
self doubts the importance of his axiomatization: "I wish I 
could say that the axiomatization for this measure was el- 
egant, straightforward, and convincing, but this is clearly 
absurd in view of the number of axioms used ... and the 
tentative nature of some of them for perceived risk." 
9 Risk defined through utility 
In the literature reported so far, mixing measurement of per- 
ceived risk with preference measurement has been rather 
carefully avoided. Jia and Dyer [34] take a different ap- 
proach. As with other authors before their objects of risk 
measurement are (discrete or continuous) random variables 
which are regarded as lotteries or gambles with (arbitrary 
number of) monetary outcomes. Like Fishburn, they believe 
that mere risk judgements are a "relative matter" and should 
be independent of location. Jia and Dyer therefore presume 
that the perceived riskiness of a lottery is evaluated with ref- 
erence to a certain target level and advocate that the expected 
value of a lottery should serve as such a reference point for 
identifying relative gains and losses. Furthermore, Jia and 
Dyer believe that the expectation principle (25) should be 
used as aggregation rule. 
Jia and Dyer [34] start from a convex set ~ of proba- 
bility distributions over a nonempty set X of possible out- 
comes. Each probability distribution is identified with the 
corresponding random variable .~. To end up with a location 
free "standard measure of risk", Jia and Dyer first like Weber 
[68] (cf. Sect. 6) "normalize" gambles by substracting their 
respective xpected values E(:~). As mentioned above, the 
"normalized" variables 
~' =~ E(~). (63) 
all have zero mean and reflect the risk of the original distri- 
bution with reference to the target outcome E(Yc). 
As domain of the risk ordering ~, then, Jia and Dyer 
take the set 
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~-o = {~, I Yc' = Y: - E(:~), 9 E ~} (64) 
of all normalized random variables induced by ~.  Com- 
paring the asymmetric part ~ of the risk ordering with the 
decision maker's trict preference ordering >-p on ~o,  they 
assume that there is an inverse relationship between m and 
b-, in the sense that for all 9', ~)' C ~o holds 
Y~' >- 9'  "', :" Y:' -<p Y ' .  (65) 
Supposing that the preference relation ~-p satisfies the 
axioms of the Expected Utility Model, Jia and Dyer define, 
for any :~ E ~ their s tandard  measure  o f  r isk by 
R(Y~) = -E[u(Y:')] = -E [u (~c  - E(Y:))] (66) 
where u is the decision maker's yon Neumann-Morgenstem 
utility function. As well as the utility function, R is unique 
up to positive affine transformations. Under the assumptions 
(65), for this risk measure holds 
:~' ~- ~' r R(Yc') > R(~'). (67) 
Because the standard measure of risk is only unique up 
to positive affine transformations it can always be rescaled 
such that all degenerate lotteries have zero risk. This can be 
achieved by setting 
R'(Y:) = R(Y:) - R(0) = R(Y:) + u(0). (68) 
One advantage of the standard measure of risk is that it 
does not impose any restrictions on the set ~ of random 
variables on which the risk ordering is defined or the form 
of the decision maker's utility function u. Through its quite 
general definition, this measure of risk allows for a number 
of different risk measures thus giving less structure than the 
risk measures presented in the earlier sections. 
The main advantage of the standard measure of risk is 
that it can be easily incorporated into a risk-value framework 
which allows the derivation of a measure of perceived risk. 
Jia and Dyer [34] show that if the axioms of the Expected 
Utility Model hold and if, in addition, a certain condition of 
r isk independence  is fulfilled the decision maker's expected 
utility E[u(:~)] allows the decomposition 
E[u(Y:)] = u(E(Y:))  - r (69) 
where r is a monotonically decreasing positive real function. 
This decompositon shows that the expected utility E[u(~)] 
of a risky random variable :~ is equal to the utility of its 
expectation which is, because of the riskiness of :~, reduced 
by an amount proportional to the rescaled standard measure 
of risk. Tbereby, 4)(E(Yc)) can be interpreted as a trade-off 
factor between "value" u(E(9.) )  and "risk" R'(:~). 
Jia and Dyer suggest to consider the "risk"-part of (69) as 
a measure of the "intensity of the risk effect on preference" 
and, therefore, to use it as a measure of perceived risk. As 
already mentioned in Sect. 5, there is empirical evidence that 
subjects' perceived risk decreases if a positive constant is 
added to all outcomes of a lottery. For that reason, the trade- 
off function 4) should be decreasing. 
Jia and Dyer's measure of perceived risk is given with 
R*(Y~) : 4)(E(:~))R'(Yc) : 4)(E(~))[R(Y:) - R(0)], (70) 
where 4) is a monotonically decreasing positive real func- 
tion. This measure of perceived risk keeps the appealing 
properties of the standard measure of risk (66). It is zero 
for degenerate lotteries, i.e. for lotteries with a single sure 
outcome, and adding a positive constant o all outcomes of 
a given lottery decreases its risk. 
The risk measure (66) obviously depends on the decision 
maker's utility function. If one takes, e.g., u to be a linear 
plus exponential utility model, u(x)  = ax  - be -~x,  where 
a > 0 and b, c > 0, then the corresponding standard measure 
of risk (66) is given with 
R(Y:) = bE[e-C(~-E(~))]  . (71) 
Note that the linear term of the utility function has no effect 
on the standard measure of risk. 
Rescaling of the measure (71) according to (68) such that 
degenerate lotteries have zero risk leads to the risk measure 
R'(Y:) = bE[e  -c(~-E(~))  - 1]. (72) 
The standard risk-value model (69) corresponding to the lin- 
ear plus exponential utility model, finally, implies the risk 
measure  
R*(Yc) = be-CE(~)E[e  -c(~-E(~))  - 1], (73) 
where, obviously, r = e -~x is a monotonically decreasing 
positive real function. The measures (71), (72), and (73) 
of perceived risk all have the appealing properties of the 
standard measure of risk (66). They are zero for degenerate 
lotteries, they fit into the standard risk-value model (69), and 
adding a positive constant to all outcomes of a given lottery 
decreases its risk. It should be noted that these risk measures 
are closely related to Sarin's measure (41) and to Weber's 
measure (43). 
10 Empirical research on risk judgements 
There are quite a lot of empirical studies investigating judge- 
ments of perceived risk. For more comprehensive overviews 
see Keller [36], E.U. Weber and Bottom [65] and Weber 
[68]). Much of the empirical evidence stated in the sequel 
has been gained through studies investigating the reasonable- 
ness of one or more of the risk measures presented above or 
their respective axioms. 
Overall these studies show that there is no model which 
is clearly superior to all the others in modelling risk judge- 
ments. However, there are some results which appear to be 
pretty stable across different empirical studies. 
9 Sub jec ts  can  g ive re l iable r isk judgements .  
A standard argument against measuring the riskiness of gam- 
bles is that subjects might not know what the riskiness of 
a gamble means to them. However, empirical studies have 
shown that subjects have a definite notion about the per- 
ceived riskiness of gambles and can give reliable risk judge- 
ments. Subjects were asked to rate alternatives according 
to their perceived riskiness twice. Ratings which were done 
two weeks later were remarkably identical to the original rat- 
ings. Even a cross cultural comparison yielded nearly iden- 
tical results in those judgements. Keller, Satin and Weber 
[37]) compared risk judgements for lotteries from students 
in California and Germany. The average judgements were 
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practically identical. In addition, the degree to which these 
risk judgements followed certain basic properties, e.g., de- 
creasing under positive translations, or disconfirmed some 
measures, e.g., Luce's logarithmic measure (28), was the 
same for both groups. 
9 Risk is not just negative preference. 
A number of studies has shown that risk judgements cannot 
be easily explained as negative preference (see, e.g., Luce 
and E.U. Weber [44], Payne [49], and E.U. Weber and Bot- 
ton [65]). E.U. Weber, Anderson, and Birnbaum [67] asked 
people to judge the riskiness and the attractiveness of lotter- 
ies. They found that both ratings were negatively correlated. 
However, the two tasks showed systematic differences in 
the rank order of judgements, thus indicating that perceived 
riskiness and preference are two distinct concepts. 
9 Risk is not represented by variance. 
Consider the three two-outcome gambles 91 = ($10, .5, $ - 
10), 92 = ($20, .2, $ - 5), and 93 = ($5, .8, $ - 20), which 
all have equal mean and variance. Coombs and Bowen [22] 
as well as Keller, Sarin and Weber [37] found that subjects, 
asked about riskiness judgements, consistently judge 93 or 92 
to be more risky than 91- This finding shows that a classical 
risk measure such as the variance is, in general, not suitable 
to numerically represent a risk ordering. 
9 Risk increases with an increase in variance or expected 
loss. 
To empirically test their distributive model (17), Coombs 
and Huang [23, 24] asked people to judge the riskiness of 
different wo-outcome gambles (y, p, z) with uniform prob- 
abilities, i.e. with p = 0.5. Thereby they clearly found that 
perceived risk of a lottery increases when variance or ex- 
pected loss of the lottery are increased. This finding implies 
that, in particular, perceived risk of a lottery increases when 
the range of the lottery is increased or when all outcomes of 
the lottery are multiplied by a constant with absolut value 
greater than one. Together, the last two results mean that an 
increase in variance is sufficient but by no means necessary 
for an increase in perceived risk. 
9 Risk decreases under positive translations. 
Testing their distributive model (17), Coombs and Huang 
[23, 24] also found that perceived risk of a lottery decreases 
under positive translations, i.e., if a positive constant is added 
to all outcomes of a gamble. This result has been confirmed 
by the study of Keller, Sarin and Weber [37]. Appearently, it 
indicates that people's risk judgements are not location free. 
As mentioned in Sect. 6, this empirical finding has been the 
starting point for the derivation of Satin's risk measure (41). 
However, there is some doubt if these studies really 
elicited pure risk judgements. It cannut be excluded that peo- 
ple not strictly separated risk from preference judgements. 
For that reason, e.g., Weber [68] suggests to use Sarin's 
risk measure in the location free form (43). As mentioned 
in Sects. 8 and 9, also Fishburn as well as Jia and Dyer 
maintain the attitude that risk measures hould be transla- 
tion invariant. 
9 Risk increases if a gamble is repeated several times. 
Repetition of gambles, up to now, has explicitly only been 
treated within Coombs psychophysics of risk (cf. Sect. 3). 
Using different wo-outcome gambles (y, p, z) with uniform 
probabilities, i.e. with p = 0.5, Coombs and Meyer [26] have 
shown that the risk of a lottery increases when it is played 
several times. However, as mentioned in Sect. 5, many psy- 
chologists believe that the risk of a gamble that is repeated 
n times is less than n times the risk of the gamble played 
once. 
9 The expectation principle may be violated. 
Keller, Sarin and Weber [37] elicited subjects' risk judge- 
ments where the gambles presented were those introduced by 
Allais [4] leading to the well-known Allais-paradoxa. They 
found that subjects violate the expectation principle. How- 
ever, these violations occur less frequently than for prefer- 
ence judgements (E.U. Weber and Bottom [65]). 
9 Risk judgements additivly combine loss and gain compo- 
nents of gambles. 
E.U. Weber and Bottom [65] have shown in two experiments 
that there is little support for Fishburn's multiplicative com- 
bination of risk measures depending on gains and losses. The 
experimental results can be explained by the CER-model of 
Luce and E.U. Weber [44]. 
11 Risk measurement under partial 
probability information 
All of the risk measures discussed so far refer to the riski- 
ness of alternatives that can be described by precise proba- 
bility distributions over possible one-dimensional outcomes. 
In practice, however, situations of partial probability infor- 
mation are prevailing. Such situations of "partial ignorance" 
(Luce and Raiffa [43]) or "ambiguity" (Ellsberg [27]) are 
simply characterized by uncertainty about probabilities of 
outcomes. 
A well-known example of a decision situation under par- 
tial probability information is Ellsberg's [27] so-called three- 
colour-problem. In this problem, an urn containing 90 balls 
is presented. 30 of these balls are known to be red. The 
remaining ones are known to be black or yellow, but with 
unknown proportion. From this urn, exactly one ball is to 
be drawn randomly. The alternatives are different bets on 
colors or pairs of colors, respectively. In this situation, ob- 
viously, the probability of red is 1/3 and the probabilities 
of black or yellow are known to be between 0 and 2/3 but 
uncertain. Camerer and Weber [17] point out the relevance 
of ambiguity for a wide range of professions and disciplines. 
They give a review of models that have been proposed to 
accomodate ambiguity. 
There is some empirical evidence that in practical eco- 
nomic situations under partial probability information, e.g. 
project evaluation, decision makers use some sort of gener- 
alized mean-risk decision rule (cf. Brachinger and Schubert 
[15]). Modelling that kind of decision behavior presupposes 
a theory of risk under conditions of partial probability infor- 
mation. Based on the emprical evidence that already guided 
H.W. Brachinger, M. Weber: Risk as a primitive 247 
Fishburn's risk study (cf. Sect. 8), Brachinger [10, 14] devel- 
oped a theory of risk under conditions of partial probability 
information in which gains and losses are treated separately. 
First, a theory of pure risk under partial probability informa- 
tion is developed where only potential osses are affected. 
Then, measures of speculative risk are proposed that allow 
for effects of potential gains on perceived risk. 
Brachinger starts from the idea of a m-dimensional vec- 
tor X = (xl, 9 9 9 x~,~) E I~ m of possible outcome values, 
m >_ 2. Partial probability information on X is covered by 
any (non-empty) subset ~,  with ] ~ ]> 1, of the set 
:= {P = (P l , . . .  ,Pro) t I Pi ~ O, Zp  i = 1} (74) 
i=1 
of all m-dimensional discrete probability distributions, Pi = 
p(xO. Thereby, ~/~ is to be interpreted as the set of all prob- 
ability distributions compatible with the available informa- 
tion on the likelihood of the outcomes of X. In Ellsberg's 
three-colour-problem, e.g., partial probability information is 
covered by 
= {P ]Pl = ~ A P2 = A A P3 = 5 -  A ;  A C [0, ]} .(75) 
The most important practical cases of partial probability 
information are those where the decision maker is able to 
(not necessarily completely) rank the outcomes of a given 
vector according to their likelihood or where he or she dis- 
poses of interval-valued probabilities of these outcomes. It 
can be shown that in all of these cases the probability infor- 
mation ~/~ is linear in the sense that it allows a description 
/~={pE~lBp>_b} , (76)  
where B is a (k x m)-dimensional matrix and b is a k- 
dimensional vector. 
According to the idea of partial probability information 
on a finite-dimensional vector of possible outcomes the the- 
ory of risk under partial probability information is, for any 
given finite dimension m, formulated in terms of the set of 
all pairs (X, ~J~), where X ~ N~ is an m-dimensional vector 
of potential outcome values and ~ c ~ a partial prob- 
ability information on X. As Fishburn, Brachinger adopts 
the position that risk judgements are location free. There- 
fore, he presumes that some target value can be identified 
so that every value smaller than the target value is viewed as 
risky and is called a loss. Every value as large as the target 
value is viewed as non-risky and is called a gain. Without 
loss of generality, for convenience, this target value is set 
at zero. Furthermore, it is assumed that outcome preference 
increases in x. 
Each vector X = (x~,. . . ,  x,~) E I~ ~ is decomposed into 
its corresponding loss vector given by 
X + := (z ] - , . . . ,  + Xm) 
:= (X+(-x~) " -X l ,  . . . , ) t+( -x ,O  9 -x~)  , (77) 
and its corresponding gain vector given by 
X :=(x~-,...,x~) 
:---- (~+(X l ) 'X l , . - - ,  ~+(Xm)" X~r~) , (78) 
where X+ is the characteristic function of the positive reals. 
For every vector X ~ Nm, its loss vector X + and its gain 
vector X are m-dimensional vectors with non-negative 
components, X +, X -  E N~. The loss vector summarizes 
all potential losses and the gain vector all potential gains of 
a given vector. 
With regard to its pure risk every pair (X, ~)  is charac- 
terized by the corresponding pair (X +, :~). I.e., objects of 
the theory of pure risk under partial probability information 
are all pairs (X +, ?~), where X + E IR~'~ is an m-dimensional 
vector of potential osses and 22~ C ,~  a partial probabil- 
ity information. Each pair (X +, :~/~ c IR~+ x p (~)  will be 
called risk vector. 
The theory of pure risk under partial probability infor- 
mation is based on a binary risk relation ~, "is at least as 
risky as", defined on I~  • p (~) .  This relation is assumed 
to be a quasi-order, i.e. reflexive and transitive. In a first 
axiom it is required that a risk vector is riskless if and only 
if there are no potential osses. In two further axioms, the 
two components of risk vectors are reflected on separately. 
A potential oss is the greater the more the corresponding 
outcome value deviates from the target value. According to 
that it is assumed that of two risk vectors with identical 
probability components one is riskier than the other if the 
loss vector of the former dominates the loss vector of the 
latter. 
According to conventional notion, risk increases as the 
chance of losses increases. In its intuitive sense, risk is the 
worst that can happen under given conditions. In the case of 
a partial probability information ,r given a specified loss 
vector X +, the "worst that can happen" is that probability 
distribution p E 2))~ which maximizes loss expectation. This 
leads to the claim that of two risk vectors (X +, ?~/~1) and 
(X +, ?/~) with identical oss vectors X + one is riskier than 
the other if 
77~ m 
X + sup Zx+pi (>_)su  e Z iPi (79) 
pE/~q i=1 pE;~f i=1 
Finally, in a further axiom it is supposed that rescaling 
of the outcome values lets the risk relation ~ invariant. 
The risk relation ~ is not assumed to be complete and 
can, beyond the structure fixed by the above axioms, be 
quite arbitrary. The intersection of all risk relations ~- on 
1I~+ x p (~)  is the smallest relation fulfilling these axioms. 
Therefore, Brachinger presumes that a risk measure should 
be a nonnegative, real-valued mapping 
R.~+ • ~(,~/~) ~ R~+ (80) 
which numerically represents the intersection of all risk rela- 
tions ~ on R~+ • ~(~) .  According to the first axiom on the 
risk relation ~ it should be equal to zero if and only if a risk 
vector's loss component is identical to the null vector. Fur- 
ther, analogous to Luce's theory of risk, it is assumed that 
the risk JR(X +, /~)  of a risk vector (X +, ~)  with rescaled 
loss component, X + :-- c~X +, is some function of the risk 
JR(X +, ~)  and c~. More specifically, corresponding to equa- 
tion (23) it is required that, for all risk vectors (X +, ~7o~) and 
all c~ > 0, there is a real function S with S(1) = 1 such that 
R(X  2, ~)  = S(oOR(X  +, ,~)  . (81) 
Thereby, S should be increasing and continuous. 
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Finally, according to the generally accepted conception 
that risk measures hould have a kind of expectation prop- 
erty, it is assumed that, for all risk vectors (X § d/z), there 
is a real function T with 
R(X  +, s~) = T(E~/(X+))  , (82) 
where, for any random variable ~, 
:= sup ~p ix~ 9 E~(37) (83) 
PC'~ i 
From these assumptions Brachinger derives the risk mea- 
sure 
m 
R~2(X +, ~/~) = k ,~(X  +, 2/))k: := k,(supEx+pi)k2 (84) 
P6'~/' i=1 
where kl, k2 are positive real constants. Equation (84) shows 
that measurement of pure risk under partial probability in- 
formation by means of a measure R~ is measurement on a 
log-interval scale. 
In a second part of his study, as in Fishburn's "Founda- 
tions of Risk Measurement", Brachinger considers measure- 
ment of speculative risk where risk-reducing effects of gains 
on perceived risk are explicitly taken into account. Based on 
empirical results provided by E.U. Weber and Bottom [65] 
and similar as in Luce and E.U.Weber's risk measure (39), 
but contrary to Fishburn's multiplicativity assumption (56), 
it is started off from the idea that positive and negative com- 
ponents of a vector of outcome values, i.e. possible gains and 
losses are combined additively to arrive at judgements of its 
riskiness. 
With regard to its speculative risk every pair (X, ;~/~ 
is characterized by the corresponding triple (X +, X - ,  :J/c). 
I.e., objects of the theory of speculative risk under par- 
tial probability information are all generalized risk vectors 
(X +, X - ,  ~) ,  where X +, X -  6 N~'+ are m-dimensional 
vectors of potential osses or gains, respectively, and :)/~ C 
~ is a partial probability information. 
Analogous to the axioms for pure risk measurement, the 
axioms for speculative risk measurement under partial prob- 
ability information are based on a binary risk relation 
defined on IR0" ~ x IR0" ~ x P(,~/)z), which is presumed to be 
a quasi-order. In a first axiom a certain kind of continuity 
is assumed by requiring that there is, for any measure R of 
pure risk, a real constant 2/> 0 with 
(X +, X - ,  ~)  ~ (0, O, ~)  r 
R (x - ,  y~) = 2/R(x +, .~). (85) 
By this constant the decision maker's risk attitudes are charc- 
terized. Risk-lovers prefer 2/< I, risk-averters "7 > 1; 2/= 1 
implies risk-neutrality. Note that according to axiom (85) 
pure risk may be overcompensated by possible gains. There- 
fore, this condition favors speculative risk measures that are 
additively separable in gains and losses. 
In further axioms it is assumed that, ceteris paribus, gen- 
eralized risk should increase with increasing amount and 
probability of loss and decrease with increasing possible 
gains and gain probability. Finally, rescaling of the outcome 
values should leave the risk ordering ~ invariant. 
A measure of speculative risk under partial probability 
information should be a mapping 
R*  . ]~m o+ x R~+ x ~X~)  ~ 1~ (86) 
with R* = 0 for every vector of outcome values which is 
riskless in the sense of (85). It should be separable in the 
sense that there are measures R~2 l, and Rll~ and a function 
F : R2+ ~ ]R such that for every generalized risk vector 
(X +, X - ,  5~) holds 
R*(x  +, x - ,  2~) = F[R~2(X + ,~) ,  Rz~21(X-, ~)11. (87) 
Thereby, F should be strictly increasing in the first vari- 
able and strictly decreasing in the second one. It should 
be linear-homogenous and fulfill certain additional technical 
properties. The measures R~21 and Rl2h quantify the pure risk 
and the chances connected with the outcome vector X. 
These assumptions lead to the three-parametric class 
R*(X+,X  , /~)  * + X- , ? /~)  = R.y,e,k(X , 
:= g(@~(X +, ~)k  _ ~(X- ,  ?/~)k), (88) 
with 7, g, k > 0 (cf. Brachinger [12] [14]). Within this class 
of generalized risk measures the parameter 7 covers the de- 
cision maker's risk attitude. The parameter k can be inter- 
preted as sensitivity parameter. In case of k > 1 the decision 
maker is sensitive, and in case of k _< 1 he is insensitive 
against he extents ~(X  +, ~)  of a generalized risk vector's 
perceived risk or perceived chance, respectively. The param- 
eter g expresses the importance the decision maker assigns 
to generalized risks. In case of g > 1 the decision maker 
"plays up", and in case of g _< 1 he "plays down" every 
non-zero generalized risk. 
12 Final remarks 
A reading of the literature on concepts and measurements 
of risk shows that there is, by now, a variety of theoret- 
ical approaches. Among these approaches it is difficult to 
select anyone as superior by convincing a priori arguments. 
Empirical data will be needed. The need for more empiri- 
cal investigations to evaluate alternative measures of risk is 
obvious. 
It seems quite realistic that some definitions of risk may 
be more useful when the objective is to predict choices un- 
der uncertainty while others may be superior predictors of 
introspective judgements of perceived risk. It has to be emp- 
hazised, however, that the risk ordering, which is the subject 
matter of all the theories reviewed, need not be related to 
the preference ordering in any simple way. 
We hold that the research on perceived risk should be 
better integrated with the descriptive as well as the prescrip- 
tive models of decisions under risk (see Sarin and Weber 
[54] for a review of risk-value models and Brachinger [13] 
for a new model). A better understanding of risk judgements 
could help us to develop more realistic risk-value models. 
In the areas of strategic planning (Bowman [9]), investment 
(Albrecht [1]), insurance (Albrecht [2]) and, especially, in 
finance risk-return considerations are standard. The capital 
asset pricing model (cf., e.g., Sharpe [56]) is based on a 
variance-expected value model, thus a special case of risk- 
return model. For the capital asset pricing model one has al- 
ready tried to develop alternative risk-value foundations (see 
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Weber  [68] for  an overv iew and  a new mode l ) .  However ,  all 
these  economic  app l i ca t ions  rest  on  a deeper  unders tand ing  
o f  r i sk  judgements .  
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